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I. INTRODUCTION 
News coverage of the recount and subsequent election contest 
in Minnesota’s 2008 election for United States Senate highlighted 
several deficiencies in Minnesota election law.  These flaws were 
significant enough that Minnesota Secretary of State Mark Ritchie 
proposed a package of election reforms.2
Although the election contest focused primarily on issues 
related to absentee balloting,
 
3
 
       † Michael Freiberg, J.D., is a Staff Attorney with the Public Health Law 
Center in St. Paul, Minnesota.  He is also an Adjunct Professor at the William 
Mitchell College of Law, teaching courses in Legislation and Public Health Law.  
He has served on the City Council of Golden Valley, Minnesota, since 2004.  He 
has a B.A. from Georgetown University and a J.D. from the William Mitchell 
College of Law. 
 one provision in state law that 
generated publicity during the recount phase of the election was 
Minnesota’s statute voiding ballots containing “identifying marks” 
or “distinguishing marks.” Minnesota Statutes section 204C.22, 
subdivision 13, provides that a ballot is defective if it “is marked by 
distinguishing characteristics in a manner making it evident that 
 1. Pennington v. Hare, 60 Minn. 146, 155, 62 N.W. 116, 120 (1895) (Collins, 
J., dissenting). 
 2. See Minnesota Secretary of State 2009 Legislative Agenda, available at 
http://www.sos.state.mn.us/home/index.asp?page=10&recordid=328. 
 3. See Statement of the Case of Appellants at 1, Coleman v. Franken, 767 
N.W.2d 453 (Minn. 2009) (No. A09-697), available at http://www.mncourts.gov/ 
Documents/0/Public/Other/A_Statement.pdf. 
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the voter intended to identify the ballot.”4  A related statute, 
section 204C.18, subdivision 2, states that any voter, election judge, 
or other individual who places such a mark upon any ballot is guilty 
of a gross misdemeanor.5
While the United States Senate recount was underway, the 
campaigns of Republican Senator Norm Coleman and Democratic-
Farmer-Labor candidate Al Franken challenged numerous ballots 
on the grounds that they contained such marks and were invalid.  
The challenged marks ranged from understandable—for example, 
initials placed next to crossed out marks to indicate a correction
 
6—
to the inexplicable, for example, multiple write-in votes on one 
ballot for “Lizard People.”7
Perhaps because of the sideshow-like atmosphere to some of 
the ballot discussions, Secretary of State Ritchie proposed 
narrowing the scope of the identifying mark statutes.
 
8  Legislation 
was introduced at the state legislature to effectuate this goal,9
 
 4. MINN. STAT. § 204C.22, subdiv.13 (2008). 
 
although it was not ultimately adopted into law.  The existence of 
these legislative initiatives makes it appropriate to examine the 
history of statutes prohibiting identifying marks, the policies 
undergirding them, and how they have been utilized in recent and 
distant Minnesota history.  This article undertakes this task and 
examines whether the Secretary of State’s recommendations are 
needed, or whether the statutes should simply be repealed.  
Advances in technology have made the process followed in 
applying these statutes accessible to an unprecedented extent, and 
the processes followed in the United States Senate recount will be 
closely examined. 
 5. MINN. STAT. § 204C.18, subdiv. 2 (2008). 
 6. See Video: State Canvassing Board - Day 1/part 1 31:17 (Minn. House Public 
Information Services Dec. 16, 2008), available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn
.us/htv/programa.asp?ls_year=85&event_id=1741. 
 7. Rachel E. Stassen-Berger & Dave Orrick, Franken in Front . . . For Now, ST. 
PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Dec. 19, 2008; Video: State Canvassing Board - Day 
3/part 1 30:50 (Minn. House Public Information Services Dec. 18, 2008), available at 
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/htv/programa.asp?ls_year=85&event_id=1747. 
 8. Minnesota Secretary of State 2009 Legislative Agenda Fact Sheet, available 
at http://www.sos.state.mn.us/docs/2009_legislative_proposal_fact_sheet.pdf. 
 9. See S.F. 1331, 86th Leg. (Minn. 2009); H.F. 1137, 2009 Leg., 86th Sess. 
(Minn. 2009); S.F. 768, 2009 Leg., 86th Sess. (Minn. 2009); S.F. 662, 2009 Leg., 
86th Sess. (Minn. 2009); H.F. 1351, 2007 Leg., 85th Sess. (Minn. 2008). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Minnesota’s identifying mark statutes may seem like some 
quirky local anachronism.  However, laws related to the 
identification of ballots can be found in nearly every state.  The 
laws take a multitude of forms.  The most expansive laws are similar 
to Minnesota Statutes section 204C.18 in that they criminalize or 
otherwise prohibit identifying marks, regardless of whether it was 
the election judge or voter who made the mark.10  Other statutes 
target only one of these groups: some laws prohibit the voters from 
placing identifying marks or other nonuniform markings on their 
ballots,11 while other statutes apply only to election officials, 
preprinted ballots, or other nonvoting third parties.12  Another 
common approach is that of Minnesota Statutes section 204C.22, 
preventing ballots containing identifying marks from being 
counted, rather than criminalizing the usage of such marks.13
A few states use unique approaches.  A statute in Alabama 
states that partisan primary voters who deface a pledge to support 
candidates of that party are presumed to be doing so for purposes 
 
 
 10. COLO. CONST. art. VII, § 8; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-1018 (8) (2006 & 
Supp. 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-2902(a) (2000); MD. CODE ANN. ELEC. LAW §§ 
16-206(a)(1), 16-206(c) (LexisNexis 2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 54, § 80 
(West 2007); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 17-130(11)–(12) (McKinney 2009); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 3599.20 (West 2007); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 260.695(9) (West 2009); P.R. 
LAWS ANN. tit. 16, § 3375(f) (2006); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 794 (2008). 
 11. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14287 (West 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.20 (West 
2008); GUAM CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 9137 (2008); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/24A-9.1 
(West 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-555 (2007) ; MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-
201(1) (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1527(3) (LexisNexis 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 659:35(II) (LexisNexis 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-25-100(A)(3) (1976 & 
Supp. 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1972 (2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
29A.84.670(1)(d) (West 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 12.13 (1)(f) (West 2004 & Supp. 
2008). 
 12. VA. CONST. art. II, § 3; ALASKA STAT. § 15.15.290 (2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 
21-2-286(b)(1) (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-1110 (2008); 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 
20/21-32 (West 2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11-10-27(d) (West 2006); WASH. REV. 
CODE  ANN. § 29A.08.161; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-13-105 (2009). 
 13. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-295 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 15, § 4973 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-438(a)(2006); HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 16-26(1) (LexisNexis 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-12-1-3(3)(; IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 49.98 (West 1999 & Supp. 2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1316(A) (2004); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 6965 (A) (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.367(1) 
(LexisNexis 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:16–3,–4 (West 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
26, § 7-127 (West 1997); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3063(a) (West 2007); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 17-20-24(b) (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-133(d) (2003 & Supp. 2008); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-4-105(5) (2007). 
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of identifying their ballots, and that such ballots will not be 
counted.14  In Arkansas, voters cannot be forced to sign a ballot for 
purposes of identifying it.15  West Virginia’s statute is similar, 
although it explicitly criminalizes the inducement of a voter to 
place an identifying mark on his or her ballot.16  Finally, statutes in 
the District of Columbia and South Dakota do not address 
identifying marks specifically, but do require that voting be secret.17
All of these identifying mark statutes appear to be rooted in 
the nineteenth century switch to the “Australian Ballot,” or secret 
ballot, system.
 
18  To understand this system, it is helpful to 
understand voting methods which existed prior to it.  Prior to the 
Revolutionary War, voting in the colonies was often accomplished 
by the show of hands or by the viva voce (voice vote) method.19  
Because of the potential for these systems to lead to bribery and 
intimidation, most states switched to a paper ballot system shortly 
after the War.20  Problems were still inherent with this system, 
however, as ballots were neither standardized nor secret.21  Justice 
Blackmun wrote that under this system, “the vote buyer could 
simply place a ballot in the hands of the bribed voter and watch 
until he placed it in the polling box.”22  Verification was made 
particularly easy because bribers and political parties would often 
print ballots “with flamboyant colors, distinctive designs, and 
emblems so that they could be recognized at a distance.”23
In the mid-nineteenth century, several Australian provinces 
 
 
 14. ALA. CODE § 17-13-8 (LexisNexis 2007). 
 15. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-309(d)(1) (2007 & Supp. 2009). 
 16. W. VA. CODE § 3-9-8 (LexisNexis 2006). 
 17. D.C. CODE § 1-1001.09(a) (2001); See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-18-27 
(2004). 
 18. See L.E. FREDMAN, THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT: THE STORY OF AN AMERICAN 
REFORM 4 (1968); John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, The Absentee Ballot and the 
Secret Ballot: Challenges for Election Reform, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 483, 488 (2003). 
 19. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 200 (1992); George v. Mun. Election 
Comm’n  of Charleston, 516 S.E.2d 206, 209 (S.C. 1999); see FREDMAN, supra note 
18, at 20–21.; see also Elwell v. Comstock, 99 Minn. 261, 266, 109 N.W. 698, 700 
(1906) (discussing ‘aye’ and ‘nay’ as examples). 
 20. Burson, 504 U.S. at 200; see FREDMAN, supra note 18, at  20 (explaining that 
bribery was diminished after introduction in Australia).  
 21. Burson, 504 U.S. at 200–01; FREDMAN, supra note 18, at 21–29. 
 22. Burson, 504 U.S. at 200; see also George, 516 S.E.2d at 209 (explaining that 
violence was a tool of intimidation). 
 23. Burson, 504 U.S. at 200. 
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developed a system intended to curb these abuses.24  Author L. E. 
Fredman identified the four features of this system as publicly 
financed ballots; ballots containing all duly nominated candidates; 
exclusive ballot distribution by election officers at polling places; 
and physical arrangements, such as voting booths, designed to 
ensure secrecy.25  The first such system was passed in the Australian 
state of Victoria in March of 1856.26  This law required voters to 
strike out the candidates for whom the voter did not want to vote.27  
The following month, the state of South Australia adopted a similar 
law, except that voters selected a candidate “by marking a cross 
within a square alongside his name on the ballot.”28  This 
approximates the system later adopted by the United States.29  In a 
jurisdiction using the Australian Ballot system, it is critical that all 
of the requirements identified by Fredman are met.  One court 
wrote that under the Australian Ballot system, “form is sacramental, 
and a voter cannot mark the ballot in any other way than the 
method prescribed.”30
The Australian Ballot system swept through the United States 
in the late nineteenth century.  Louisville, Kentucky, adopted the 
first Australian Ballot law in the United States in February of 1888.
 
31  
Massachusetts and New York adopted similar laws later in the same 
year.32  By 1892, thirty-eight states had such a system in place.33
The new system was a success.  Contemporary observers of the 
New York law noted that because of the new voting system, 
“intimidation by employers, party bosses, police officers, saloon-
keepers and others has come to an end.”
 
34
 
 24. Burson, 504 U.S. at 202 (referring to it as the Australian system); FREDMAN, 
supra note 18, at 6–10. 
  Perhaps because of the 
success of this system in curbing corruption, the pendulum of 
voting secrecy swung dramatically in the other direction.  Early 
 25. FREDMAN, supra note 18, at 46. 
 26. Id. at 46–47.  
 27. Id.at 8. 
 28. Id. at 9. 
 29. Id. at 46–47. 
 30. Leray v. Mullican, 456 So. 2d 1038, 1041 (La. Ct. App. 1984). 
 31. FREDMAN, supra note 18, at 31. 
 32. Id. at ix; Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 203 (1992). 
 33. Id. at ix;  see also Burson  504 U.S. at 204–05 (stating that by 1896, nearly 
ninety percent of the states had adopted the Australian system). 
 34. Burson, 504 U.S. at 200 (quoting W. Ivins, The Electoral System of the State of 
New York, Proceedings of the 29th Annual Meeting of the New York State Bar Association 
316 (1906)). 
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advocates of the Australian Ballot system so valued the secrecy of 
ballots that they argued that any ballot which could subsequently 
be identified should be rejected.  In 1891, George Hill argued in 
the first issue of the Yale Law Journal that “[n]o method of secret 
balloting can accomplish its purposes, which leaves unguarded any 
way of so discriminating between ballots cast, as will enable the 
counters to determine how any individual voted.  Hence, any secret 
ballot law must carefully provide for the rejection of any ballot 
which is so marked as to be subsequently recognized.”35  
Contemporary observers have also noted that ballots capable of 
identification violate the spirit of Australian ballot laws.  One law 
journal article notes that “[t]here are a number of ways that the 
secrecy of the ballot can be violated . . . . Ballots can be color coded 
or given distinguishing marks so that party observers can view from 
afar which party the voter is choosing.”36
Minnesota’s policy prohibiting identifying marks was instituted 
in this context.  The first constitution of the state required that “all 
elections shall be by ballot,” except in the case of certain township 
officers.
 
37  This provision has not changed in over 150 years.38  In 
the 1879 case of Brisbin v. Cleary, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
interpreted this provision to mean that voting must occur “in such 
a way as to secure to the elector the privilege of complete and 
inviolable secrecy in regard to the person voted for.”39  
Consequently, the court struck down a state law requiring ballots to 
be numbered in a way that could permit their identification.40
From 1878 until 1893, Minnesota election law was in a near-
constant state of flux.  In 1878, the legislature passed an election 
law that applied to cities with populations exceeding 12,000.
 
41  
While not an Australian ballot law,42
 
 35. George E. Hill, The Secret Ballot, 1 YALE L.J. 26, 29 (1891). 
 this law contained a provision 
prohibiting a ballot from being “used or voted” if it contained “any 
cut or device on its face, or any cut or device, or any written or 
printed matter on the back, or in any other way made to distinguish 
 36. Fortier & Ornstein, supra note 18, at 488. 
 37. MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 6 (1858). 
 38. See MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 5 (2008) (sections changed from 6 to 5). 
 39. Brisbin v. Cleary, 26 Minn. 107, 108, 1 N.W. 825, 826 (1879); accord  Elwell 
v. Comstock, 99 Minn. 261, 265, 109 N.W. 698, 699 (1906). 
 40. Brisbin, 26 Minn. at 108, 1 N.W. at 826. 
 41. 1878 MINN. LAWS 133. 
 42. FREDMAN, supra note 18, at 60. 
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one ballot from another.”43  The law did not criminalize the act of 
voters placing such “devices” on their ballots, but prevented 
identifiable ballots from being printed.  Consequently, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court held that this provision did not 
invalidate ballots on which voters used adhesive stickers containing 
the name of preferred candidates to indicate their votes.44
In 1887, the legislature repealed the 1878 election law, 
including the provision relating to a distinguishable “cut or 
device,” and adopted a new election law.
 
45  Like the 1878 law, the 
1887 law was not an Australian ballot law,46 nor did it contain a 
provision relating to identified ballots.  However, the new law did 
explicitly criminalize the revealing of votes by “any judge or clerk of 
election, or any other person.”47
In 1889, Minnesota adopted the Australian ballot system in 
cities of over 10,000 in population,
 
48 repealing the 1887 law as it 
applied to cities of that size.49  This law provided for uniform ballots 
supplied by the State Auditor for state elections, County Auditor 
for county elections, and city clerk for city elections.50  Voters were 
to select their candidate by a “cross (X) mark.”51 The law included 
provisions to ensure physical secrecy for voters.52  The law did not 
contain a provision criminalizing the use of identifying marks or 
providing that ballots containing such marks would not be 
counted.53  It did, however, disqualify ballots which voters had 
showed to others,54 except in the case of illiterate or disabled 
voters.55  The law also stated that election judges, persons assisting 
disabled or illiterate voters, and other third parties who disclosed 
how any voter had voted were guilty of a misdemeanor.56
 
 43. 1878 MINN. LAWS 134. 
 
 44. Quinn v. Markoe, 37 Minn. 439, 440, 35 N.W. 263, 264 (1887). 
 45. 1887 MINN. LAWS 7. 
 46. FREDMAN, supra note 18, at 60. 
 47. 1887 MINN. LAWS 37. 
 48. 1889 MINN. LAWS 13.  See also 4 FRANK R. HOLMES, MINNESOTA IN THREE 
CENTURIES 165 (James A. Baker et al. eds., Semi-centennial ed. 1908). 
 49. 1889 MINN. LAWS 39. 
 50. Id. at 16–17. 
 51. Id. at 19, 22. 
 52. Id. at 21–22. 
 53. Pennington v. Hare, 60 Minn. 146, 154, 62 N.W. 116, 120 (1895) (Collins, 
J., dissenting). 
 54. 1889 MINN. LAWS 22. 
 55. Id. at 24. 
 56. Id. 
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In 1891, Minnesota’s Australian ballot law was broadened to 
cover all cities,57 repealing both the 1887 and 1889 laws.58  This law 
had similar provisions to the 1889 law regarding uniform ballots,59 
physical conditions to ensure secrecy,60 the use of cross marks,61 
and assistance for disabled or illiterate voters.62  The law did not 
address identifying marks, but the law did criminalize the 
disclosure of votes by election judges and voters.63
In 1893, the legislature rewrote the election laws once again,
 
64 
creating the framework that is used today and repealing the 1891 
law.65  This law was also an Australian ballot law and had similar 
provisions to the 1891 law regarding uniform ballots,66 secret 
booths,67 cross marks for voting,68 and assistance for illiterate and 
disabled voters.69  The 1893 law did not explicitly criminalize the 
use of identifying marks or prevent ballots containing such marks 
from being counted.70  However, it now prohibited voters from 
disclosing the contents of their ballots and stated that such ballots 
should not be counted.71
The 1893 law also stated that if voters consistently used a mark 
other than an X, “such as V, or I, or –, or O,” it would be 
considered a sufficient vote, “but not if the crossmark (X) be used 
elsewhere on the same ballot.”
 
72  In the 1895 case of Pennington v. 
Hare, the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted this provision to 
prohibit the counting of any ballot containing “any distinguishing 
mark, whereby it may be certified to others how [a voter] voted.”73
 
 57. 1891 MINN. LAWS 23; HOLMES, supra note 48, at 181. 
  
 58. 1891 Minn. Laws 65–66. 
 59. Id. at 37–38. 
 60. Id. at 43–44. 
 61. Id. at 45. 
 62. Id. at 46. 
 63. Id. at 63. 
 64. 1893 MINN. LAWS 16. 
 65. Id. at 77. 
 66. Id. at 20–21. 
 67. Id. at 42. 
 68. Id. at 48. 
 69. Id. at 50–51. 
 70. Pennington v. Hare, 60 Minn. 146, 155, 62 N.W. 116, 120 (1895) (Collins, 
J., dissenting). 
 71. 1893 MINN. LAWS 51. 
 72. Id. at 60.  A more limited version of this provision still exists in the 
Minnesota Statutes. See MINN. STAT. § 204C.22, subdiv. 10 (2008). 
 73. Pennington, 60 Minn. at 149, 62 N.W. at 117–18. 
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Justice Loren Collins strenuously dissented, describing the court’s 
interpretation as “radical” and noting that the court was 
“anticipating an evil which may never exist.”74  Thus, the policy of 
rejecting ballots containing identifying marks was created judicially, 
rather than statutorily, in Minnesota.  This policy was reinforced by 
multiple subsequent decisions invalidating ballots on this basis.75
In 1933, the Minnesota Legislature adopted the predecessor to 
section 204C.18, subdivision 2, which criminalizes the use of 
identifying marks.
 
76  The original statute applied to any “voter, 
judge or clerk of election or other person” who places an 
identifying mark on a ballot77.  The penalty is a gross misdemeanor, 
a serious penalty punishable by a fine of up to $3,000.78  There was 
still no statute on the books, however, requiring ballots containing 
identifying marks to be rejected.79  Minnesota courts continued to 
follow this policy, however.80
The Legislature formalized the courts’ policy of rejecting 
identified ballots in 1959.
 
81  The law, which became Minnesota 
Statutes section 204C.22, subdivision 13, provided that an entire 
ballot is void if it is “so marked by distinguishing characteristics that 
it is evident that the voter intended to identify his ballot.” In 1961, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted this provision as not 
applying to identifying marks written by election judges, but only by 
voters.82  The court has continued to develop case law as to what 
constitutes an identified ballot.83
 
 74. Id. at 155, 62 N.W. at 120 (Collins, J., dissenting). 
 
 75. McVeigh v. Spang, 178 Minn. 578, 228 N.W. 155 (1929); Nelson v. 
Bullard, 155 Minn. 419, 194 N.W. 308 (1923); In re Redwood County Election 
Contest, 178 Minn. 578, 156 N.W. 125 (1916); In re Lannon, 107 Minn. 453, 120 
N.W. 1082 (1909); Bloedel v. Cromwell, 104 Minn. 487, 116 N.W. 947 (1908); 
Elwell v. Comstock, 99 Minn. 261, 109 N.W. 698 (1906); Truelsen v. Hugo, 81 
Minn. 73, 83 N.W. 500 (1900), overruled in part on other grounds. 
 76. 1933 MINN. LAWS 310. 
 77.  Id. 
 78. MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 4 (2008). 
 79. Hanson v. Emanuel, 210 Minn. 271, 273, 297 N.W. 749, 751 (1941). 
 80. See State v. Hanson, 229 Minn. 341, 38 N.W.2d 845 (1949) (involving the 
secret ballot provisions of labor laws which relied on precedents discussing 
identifying marks on ballots); Murray v. Floyd, 216 Minn. 69, 11 N.W.2d 780 
(1943); Aura v. Brandt, 211 Minn. 281, 1 N.W.2d 381 (1941), overruled in part on 
other grounds; Pye v. Hanzel, 200 Minn. 135, 273 N.W. 611 (1937); Frajola v. Zanna, 
193 Minn. 48, 257 N.W. 660 (1934), overruled in part on other grounds. 
 81. 1959 MINN. LAWS 1182. 
 82. Marshall v. Stepka, 259 Minn. 533, 560, 108 N.W.2d 614, 619 (1961). 
 83. Johnson v. Swenson, 264 Minn. 449, 119 N.W.2d 723 (1963); Fitzgerald v. 
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The Minnesota Supreme Court has generally identified 
ensuring secrecy and preventing corruption as the primary 
rationales for refusing to count ballots containing identifying 
marks.  The rationale for the policy has been stated variously as 
avoiding the evil of voting “according to contract,”84 preventing 
“the corruption of the voter and to secure a free and untrammeled 
expression of the popular will,”85 preventing “the corruption and 
intimidation of the voter in violation of the letter and spirit of the 
Australian ballot law,”86 “to preserve secrecy in voting and to 
prevent bribery, fraud, and intimidation at elections,”87 and 
preventing “the possibility of connivance between a corrupt elector 
and third persons who require evidence that a vote has been cast in 
a particular manner.”88
A ballot so marked cannot be counted; otherwise, a 
corrupt candidate might, by previous agreement, arrange 
with his purchased creatures to place a particular mark 
after his name, whereby he could ascertain, when the 
ballots were canvassed, that they had kept faith with him, 
and were entitled to the purchase price of their honor.
  The case that initially created the policy 
perhaps put it most colorfully:  
89
III. ANALYSIS 
 
Having analyzed the history of and policy behind statutes in 
Minnesota and elsewhere criminalizing the identification of ballots 
or prohibiting such ballots from being counted, it is worth 
evaluating whether or not these statutes are still needed.  Although 
many states follow similar practices, the policies underlying the 
Minnesota statutes are in fact anachronistic.  This is the case for 
several reasons. 
Most obviously, refusing to count identified ballots 
disenfranchises voters.  The U.S. Supreme Court has noted, 
perhaps somewhat surprisingly, that “the Constitution of the 
 
Morlock, 264 Minn. 520, 120 N.W.2d 339 (1963); Sperl v. Wegwerth, 265 Minn. 47, 
120 N.W.2d 355 (1963); Bell v. Gannaway, 303 Minn. 346, 227 N.W.2d 797 (1975). 
 84. Truelsen v. Hugo, 81 Minn. 73, 74, 83 N.W. 500, 501 (1900). 
 85. Elwell v. Comstock, 99 Minn. 261, 270, 109 N.W. 698, 702 (1906). 
 86. Hanson v. Emanuel, 210 Minn. 271, 273, 297 N.W. 749, 751 (1941). 
 87. Aura v. Brandt, 211 Minn. 281, 283, 1 N.W.2d 381, 384 (1941). 
 88. Johnson, 264 Minn. at 456, 119 N.W.2d at  728 (Otis, J., dissenting). 
 89. Pennington v. Hare, 60 Minn. 146, 149, 62 N.W. 116, 118 (1895). 
2. Freiberg.docx 11/21/2009  6:39 PM 
2009] MINNESOTA’S IDENTIFYING MARK STATUTE 55 
United States does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one.”90  
The Court also noted, however, that it is “for the States to 
determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be 
exercised.”91  Minnesota is one state which takes the right of 
suffrage seriously.  Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court has 
observed that “the right to vote is considered fundamental under 
both the U.S. Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution.”92
The right of suffrage in Minnesota begins with the state 
constitution, which provides unequivocally that “[n]o member of 
this state shall be disfranchised.”
 
93  This provision has existed 
unchanged since statehood,94 but has not been extensively litigated.  
In one case, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the provision 
did not invalidate a law voiding ballots on which the voter voted for 
more than one county division question, in an election with several 
conflicting questions.95  A second decision held that the 
constitutional provision required county commissioner districts to 
be roughly equal in population, unless disparities were 
unavoidable.96  In this decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court held 
that the “right to vote on a basis of reasonable equality with other 
citizens is a fundamental and personal right essential to the 
preservation of self-government.  Fundamental rights may be lost 
by dilution as well as by outright denial.”97
A related provision of the state constitution provides that 
eligible voters “shall be entitled to vote.”
  Refusing to count an 
identified ballot is, of course, an example of “outright denial” that 
would presumably be discouraged by the court were it to rule on 
the question. 
98
 
 90. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874) (language reaffirmed in City 
of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 76 (1980)); see also State v. Webber, 96 Minn. 
422, 430, 105 N.W. 490, 493 (1905). 
  The criteria for voting 
eligibility have changed since statehood, but the mandatory nature 
 91. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 76–77 (1980) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 92. Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 830 (2005) (citing Harper v. Virginia 
State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966)). 
 93. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
 94. Id., quoted in S. Rep. No. 36-21, accompanying S. 86 to the Committee on 
Territories (1858). 
 95. State v. Falk, 89 Minn. 269, 274, 94 N.W. 879, 881 (1903). 
 96. State v. Hetherington, 240 Minn. 298, 305, 61 N.W.2d 737, 742 (1953). 
 97. Id. at 303, 61 N.W.2d at 741. 
 98. MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (emphasis added). 
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of the franchise has not.99  Case law interpreting this provision 
bears on the question of whether identified ballots should be 
excluded.  A 1912 case held that “the right of a qualified elector to 
vote at any election . . . cannot be changed or added to by statute,” 
although “the Legislature may make and impose such reasonable 
regulations and conditions which it deems necessary to secure a 
pure and orderly election and to guard against unfair 
combinations, undue influence, and coercion, although they may 
incidentally affect the right of an elector to vote.”100  One justice 
described the constitutional provision as “an express guaranty of a 
right or privilege which cannot be denied, or substantially impaired 
or abridged by legislation.  It is a civil privilege protected by the 
fundamental law.”101
Consistent with this view, nearly all of the Minnesota cases that 
have approved of the invalidation of identified ballots have 
recognized that the disenfranchisement of voters is a substantial 
evil that should be avoided.
 
102  The case creating the policy not to 
count identified ballots took it as a given that “electors 
unaccustomed to the use of pen or pencil” should not be 
“disfranchised.”103  Numerous other cases involving identified 
ballots have frowned upon the disenfranchisement of voters.104  In 
discussing voter intent, one decision held that “to the end that the 
unintelligent voter might not be disfranchised and deprived of his 
vote, liberal rules for ascertaining the intent of the voter and for 
counting ballots are provided.”105
 
 99. Id. (quoted in S. Rep. No. 36-21). 
  This is in contrast to courts from 
 100. State v. Erickson, 119 Minn. 152, 156, 137 N.W. 385, 386 (1912).  See also 
Saari v. Gleason, 126 Minn. 378, 382, 148 N.W. 293, 295 (1914). 
 101. Farrell v. Hicken, 125 Minn. 407, 415, 147 N.W. 815, 818 (1914) (Brown, 
C.J., dissenting). 
 102. See, e.g., Elwell v. Comstock, 99 Minn. 261, 270, 109 N.W. 698, 701 (1906); 
Bloedel v. Cromwell, 104 Minn. 487, 488, 116 N.W. 948, 948 (1908); Nelson v. 
Bullard, 155 Minn. 419, 426, 194 N.W. 308, 311 (1923); Aura v. Brandt, 211 Minn. 
281, 283, 1 N.W.2d 381, 384 (1941), overruled in part on other grounds by Murray v. 
Floyd, 216 Minn. 69, 75, 11 N.W.2d 780, 785 (1943); Marshall v. Stepka, 259 Minn. 
553, 558, 108 N.W.2d 614, 618 (1961); Johnson v. Swenson, 264 Minn. 449, 457, 
119 N.W.2d 723, 728 (1963); Fitzgerald v. Morlock, 264 Minn. 520, 539, 120 
N.W.2d 339, 354 (1963); Sperl v. Wegwerth, 265 Minn. 47, 52, 120 N.W.2d 355, 
359 (1963). 
 103. Pennington v. Hare, 60 Minn. 146, 149, 62 N.W. 116, 118 (1895). 
 104. See supra note 102. 
 105. Truelsen v. Hugo, 81 Minn. 73, 74, 83 N.W. 500, 501 (1900), overruled in 
part on other grounds by Murray v. Floyd, 216 Minn. 69, 75, 11 N.W.2d 780, 785 
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other states, which apply identifying mark statutes formalistically.106  
Indeed, Minnesota might actually be more hesitant than other 
jurisdictions in voiding ballots because of identifying marks.107
The identifying mark statutes may also be anachronistic and 
constitutionally suspect because they lead to the unequal treatment 
of voters.  Although there is no federal constitutional right of 
suffrage, federal law does frown on the unequal treatment of 
voters.  Perhaps most notably, Bush v. Gore held that “[h]aving once 
granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later 
arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that 
of another.”
  
Consequently, one would think that voiding identified ballots 
would be frowned upon in Minnesota. 
108  In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a 
Florida law requiring a voter’s intent to be determined was not 
being applied consistently in the case of the notorious “hanging” 
and “dimpled” chads, failing constitutional scrutiny.109 The Court 
noted specifically that the law violated the equal protection clause 
because “the standards for accepting or rejecting contested ballots 
might vary not only from county to county but indeed within a 
single county from one recount team to another.”110
The Minnesota Supreme Court has evaluated numerous 
examples of what could be considered identifying marks, and its 
rulings have been far from consistent.  The court has held that the 
following constitute identifying marks: a voter’s name written on 
the back of a ballot,
  As we will 
shortly see, the Minnesota Supreme Court and the State Canvassing 
Board have also not consistently applied tests determining what 
constitutes an identified ballot, creating a potential problem of 
federal constitutional law. 
111 a voter’s initials,112
 
(1943); see also Fitzgerald, 264 Minn. at 535, 120 N.W.2d at 352; McVeigh v. Spang, 
178 Minn. 578, 585, 228 N.W. 155, 158 (1929). 
 “a distinct X” on the back 
 106. See, e.g., Leray v. Mullican, 456 So. 2d 1038, 1041 (La. Ct. App). 
 107. See Hanson v. Emanuel, 210 Minn. 271, 274, 297 N.W. 749, 752 (1941). 
 108. 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000). 
 109. Id. at 105–06. 
 110. Id. at 106. 
 111. Pye v. Hanzel, 200 Minn. 135, 139, 273 N.W. 611, 614 (1937); Bloedel v. 
Cromwell, 104 Minn. 487, 488, 116 N.W. 948, 949 (1908); Pennington v. Hare, 60 
Minn. 146, 149, 62 N.W. 116, 118 (1895).  
 112. Bloedel, 104 Minn. at 488, 116 N.W. at  949; Elwell v. Comstock, 99 Minn. 
261, 270, 109 N.W. 698, 701 (1906).  
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of a ballot,113 cross marks over the word “judge,”114 inconsistent use 
of voting marks or superfluous voting marks,115 numbers written on 
a ballot by a voter,116a candidate’s name written in unnecessarily 
with a line through it,117 unnecessary marks by a candidate’s 
name,118 “a diagonal mark with a faint curl at the top and two very 
small curls at the bottom,”119 cross marks on the back of a ballot,120 
a cross mark over the ballot instructions,121 two parallel lines next to 
a candidate’s name,122 a cross mark next to a blank write-in area,123 
a “distinctive check mark” after the proper cross,124 four “heavily 
penciled circle[s]” next to the cross marks which “appear like four 
balls added with conscious effort,”125 the underlining of a 
candidate’s name,126 an indecent remark or drawing,127 and ballots 
marked with the words “AFL” and “NO.”128
In contrast, the court ruled that the following were not 
identifying marks: stickers containing names of candidates;
 
129 marks 
written on ballots by election judges;130
 
 113. McVeigh v. Spang, 178 Minn. 578, 582, 228 N.W. 155, 156–58 (1929). 
 a “vulgar expression” after a 
 114. Pye, 200 Minn. at 138, 273 N.W. at 614. 
 115.  Fitzgerald v. Morlock, 264 Minn. 520, 524, 120 N.W.2d 339, 348 (1963); 
Sperl v. Wegwerth, 265 Minn. 47, 48–49, 120 N.W.2d 355, 357 (1963); Murray v. 
Floyd, 216 Minn. 69, 71, 11 N.W.2d 780, 783 (1943); Pye, 200 Minn. at 140, 273 
N.W. at 614. 
 116. Aura v. Brandt, 211 Minn. 281, 291, 1 N.W.2d 381, 388 (1941); Pye, 200 
Minn. at 139, 273 N.W. at 614. 
 117. Pye v. Hanzel, 200 Minn. 135, 139, 273 N.W. 611, 614 (1937). 
 118. Hanson v. Emanuel, 210 Minn. 271, 277–78, 297 N.W. 749, 753–54 
(1941); Pye, 200 Minn. at 145, 273 N.W. at 617. 
 119. Hanson, 210 Minn. at 278, 297 N.W. at 754. 
 120. Aura, 211 Minn. at 286, 1 N.W.2d at 386. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 290, 1 N.W.2d at 387, overruled by Murray v. Floyd, 216 Minn. 69, 74–
75, 11 N.W.2d 780, 784 (1943) (expressing judicial reluctance to disenfranchise a 
voter). 
 124. Aura, 211 Minn. at 290, 1 N.W.2d at 387. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Murray v. Floyd, 216 Minn. at 71, 11 N.W.2d at 783. 
 127. Id. at 72–74, 11 N.W.2d at 784 (overruling portions of Frajola v. Zanna, 
193 Minn. 48, 257 N.W. 660 (1934) and Truelsen v. Hugo, 81 Minn. 73, 83 N.W. 
500 (1900)). 
 128. State v. Hanson, 229 Minn. 341, 350–351, 38 N.W.2d 845, 850 (1949). 
 129. Hanson v. Emanuel, 210 Minn. 271, 275–280, 297 N.W. 749, 752–54 
(1941); Quinn v. Markoe, 37 Minn. 439, 440, 35 N.W. 263, 264 (1887). 
 130. Fitzgerald v. Morlock, 264 Minn. 520, 533–34, 120 N.W.2d 339, 351 
(1963); Johnson v. Swenson, 264 Minn. 449, 455–56, 119 N.W.2d 723, 728 (1963); 
Marshall v. Stepka, 259 Minn. 533, 560, 108 N.W.2d 614, 619 (1961); Pye v. 
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candidate’s name;131 a voter’s erased name;132 the word “nit”;133 the 
phrase “May the best man win”;134 an attempted erasure of a voting 
mark;135 the words “wet” and “dry” on a county prohibition 
initiative;136 various stray marks;137 the phrase “SkverDeall O. K.” 
written at the end of the ballot;138 the phrase “10 yrs” written after a 
vote;139 the phrase “No good” next to a candidate’s name;140 slight 
damage to ballots, such as burns, rips, or smudges;141 cross marks 
outside the proper square for voting;142 the inaccurate but 
phonetically correct spelling of a write-in candidate’s name;143 a 
write-in vote for an office not up for election;144 an obliteration of a 
voting mark;145 cross marks consistently in the wrong place;146
 
Hanzel, 200 Minn. 135, 144–45, 273 N.W. 611, 616 (1937); Pennington v. Hare, 60 
Minn. 146, 147–49, 62 N.W. 116, 117 (1895).  
 a 
 131. Truelsen v. Hugo, 81 Minn. 73, 77, 83 N.W. 500, 502 (1900), overruled by 
Murray v. Floyd, 216 Minn. 69, 73–74, 11 N.W.2d 780, 784 (1943) (offering the 
conclusory statement: “such a remark . . . has no legitimate connection with bona 
fide voting.”). 
 132. Elwell v. Comstock, 99 Minn. 261, 270, 109 N.W. 698, 701 (1906). 
 133. Id. at 271, 109 N.W. at 702. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Murray, 216 Minn. at 72, 11 N.W.2d  at 783; Aura v. Brandt, 211 Minn. 
281, 290, 1 N.W.2d 381, 388 (1941),overruled in part on other grounds; Pye v. Hanzel, 
200 Minn. 135, 144, 273 N.W. 611, 616 (1937); In re Lannon, 107 Minn. 453, 456–
57, 120 N.W. 1082, 1084 (1909). 
 136. In re Redwood County Election Contest, 132 Minn. 290, 293–94, 156 N.W. 
125, 126 (1916). 
 137. Fitzgerald v. Morlock, 264 Minn. 520, 528, 120 N.W.2d 339, 348 (1963); 
Sperl v. Wegwerth, 265 Minn. 47, 52, 120 N.W.2d 355, 358–59 (1963); Hanson v. 
Emanuel, 210 Minn. 271, 276–77, 297 N.W. 749, 753 (1941); Frajola v. Zanna, 193 
Minn. 48, 257 N.W. 660, 660–61 (1934); In re Redwood County, 132 Minn. at 293, 
156 N.W. at 126. 
 138. Frajola, 193 Minn. at 49, 257 N.W. at 660 (holding that the voter believed 
those he voted for “represented to him a ‘square deal’ and that they were ‘all 
right.’”), overruled by Murray v. Floyd, 216 Minn. 69, 11 N.W.2d 780, 784 (1943). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Pye v. Hanzel, 200 Minn. 138, 139–40, 273 N.W. 611, 614 (1937).  
 141. Sperl v. Wegwerth, 265 Minn. 47, 53, 120 N.W.2d 355, 359 (1963); Aura v. 
Brandt, 211 Minn. 281, 286, 1 N.W.2d 381, 386 (1941), overruled in part on other 
grounds; Hanson v. Emanuel, 210 Minn. 271, 279, 297 N.W. 749, 754 (Minn. 1941); 
Pye, 200 Minn. at 146, 273 N.W. at 617. 
 142. Hanson, 210 Minn. at 276–77, 297 N.W. at 753. 
 143. Id. at 280, 297 N.W. at 754–55. 
 144. Aura, 211 Minn.  at 284–85, 1 N.W.2d  at 385 (requiring a reasonable 
belief that the office was up for election). 
 145. Fitzgerald v. Morlock, 264 Minn. 520, 532, 120 N.W.2d 339, 350 (1963); 
Murray v. Floyd, 216 Minn. 69, 72, 11 N.W.2d 780, 783 (Minn. 1943); Aura, 211 
Minn. at 290, 1 N.W.2d at 388. 
 146. Aura, 211 Minn. at 287, 1 N.W.2d at 386. See Fitzgerald, 264 Minn. at 528, 
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cross mark next to the blank line for write-in votes;147 non-uniform 
voting marks;148 the word “no” next to an obliteration;149 a heavily 
penciled line indicating a desire not to vote for coroner;150 an oval 
mark presumably resulting “from the voter’s testing the writing 
quality of his pen before marking the ballot;”151 votes made in 
pencil and pen on the same ballot;152 the use of two cross marks 
while voting for one office;153 write-in votes for “Anderson,” “Jake,” 
“anyone else,” “Phillips,” and “C”, as well as write-in votes of 
candidates for different offices and an incomplete write-in vote;154 
an illegible write-in vote;155 and a torn ballot fixed with Scotch 
tape.156
Although these holdings are based on different versions of 
statutes or no statute at all, the court in each case undertook the 
ostensible task of determining whether the voter intended to 
identify the ballot.  The inconsistencies are apparent.  It is difficult 
to comprehend, for example, why cross marks over the word 
“judge” are identifying marks but a heavily penciled line indicating 
a desire not to vote for coroner is not.  Similarly, it is difficult to 
comprehend why the inconsistent use of voting marks or 
superfluous voting marks would be found to be identifying marks 
in one case but the opposite result would be reached in the case of 
non-uniform voting marks.  Indecent remarks have received 
similarly inconsistent treatment.  Finally, one wonders why the 
words “AFL” and “No” were held to identify a ballot, but the words 
“wet” and “dry” were not, when they both emphasized the voters’ 
preferred result.  It is easy to see how such conclusions could run 
afoul of Bush v. Gore’s command that all votes be treated equally. 
 
During the recount phase of Minnesota’s 2008 election for 
 
120 N.W.2d. at 347–48. 
 147. Murray, 216 Minn. at 75–76, 11 N.W.2d at 785 (overruling in part Aura v. 
Brandt, 211 Minn. 281, 1 N.W.2d 381 (1941)); see also Fitzgerald, 264 Minn. at 529, 
120 N.W.2d at 348 (accepting as valid a ballot containing a non-uniform mark). 
 148. See, e.g., Fitzgerald, 264 Minn. at 528, 120 N.W.2d at 347; Sperl v. 
Wegwerth, 265 Minn. 47, 51–52, 120 N.W.2d 355, 358 (Minn. 1963). 
 149. Fitzgerald, 264 Minn. at 528, 120 N.W.2d at 347. 
 150. Id. at 529, 120 N.W.2d at 348. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Bell v. Gannaway, 303 Minn. 346, 346–49, 227 N.W.2d 797, 800–01 
(1975); Fitzgerald, 264 Minn. at 533, 120 N.W.2d at 350. 
 154. Fitzgerald, 264 Minn. at 352–53, 120 N.W.2d at 339, 350 (1963). 
 155. Id.  
 156. Sperl v. Wegwerth, 265 Minn. 47, 50, 120 N.W.2d 355, 359 (1963). 
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United States Senate, the State Canvassing Board also applied 
Minnesota Statutes section 204C.22, subdivision 13, and the results 
were similarly inconsistent.  Before examining the Board’s rulings, 
however, it should be noted that the State Canvassing Board is a 
body with limited authority that does not adhere to judicial 
procedures such as the Rules of Evidence.157  Recounts of federal 
races are “limited in scope to the determination of the number of 
votes validly cast for the office to be recounted. Only the ballots 
cast in the election and the summary statements certified by the 
election judges may be considered in the recount process.”158
This does not mean, however, that there is no value in 
studying the Canvassing Board’s rulings.  Even though the Board 
does not adhere to the Rules of Evidence, it does follow the 
Administrative Procedures Act in the case of recounts.
 
159  Further, 
the Board is composed of the Minnesota Secretary of State and 
four judges: two district court judges, and two state supreme court 
justices.160  During the 2008 U.S. Senate recount, the Canvassing 
Board included the Chief Justice of the Minnesota Supreme 
Court.161
Several rulings of the Canvassing Board in the 2008 U.S. 
Senate recount are inconsistent.  For example, after a voter made a 
correction to his ballot, he had that correction witnessed by two 
people.  The Board held that this did not constitute an identified 
  These are individuals who are more than marginally 
acquainted with judicial procedures and the interpretation of 
statutes such as section 204C.22, subdivision 13.  Consequently, it is 
illustrative to examine the rulings of the State Canvassing Board as 
to what constitutes an identified ballot.  During the 2008 Senate 
recount, the Board’s proceedings were accessible to an 
unprecedented extent via video streaming over the internet.  Such 
an examination is therefore a simple endeavor. 
 
 157. MINN. STAT. § 204C.31, subdiv. 3 (2008). 
 158. MINN. STAT. § 204C.35, subdiv. 3 (2008).  See also Video: State Canvassing Board 
- Day 2/part 4 (Minn. House Public Information Services Dec. 17, 2008), available at 
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/htv/programa.asp?ls_year=85&event_id=1746 
(stating that the State Canvassing Board does not address legal questions and is 
limited to conducting a canvass and “plowing through something around 1,000 
challenged ballots in the next two days”). 
 159. MINN. STAT. § 204C.361(a) (2008). 
 160. MINN. STAT. § 204C.31, subdiv. 2 (2008). 
 161. See State Canvassing Board Minutes, December 16, 2008–December 19, 
2008, page 1, available at http://www.sos.state.mn.us/docs/december_16_2008
_state_canvassing_board_minutes.pdf. 
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ballot.162  Yet the next day, the Board held that a ballot witnessed by 
a non-voter was identified and void.163  Some statements of 
Canvassing Board members directly anticipate inconsistent 
application of the rules.  For example, one Board member stated 
that “[w]hen it comes to the armed services, we should err on the 
side of what they intend.”164
Several Canvassing Board decisions also directly contravened 
established case law in Minnesota, leading to additional 
inconsistencies.  Murray v. Floyd held that “an indecent remark or 
drawing on a ballot serves to identify it as much as a superfluous 
cross or other mark.”
  Yet, nothing in the statutes suggests 
that more liberal rules should be applied in the case of military 
voters as opposed to civilian voters. 
165  Yet, the 2008 Canvassing Board held that 
what one Board member described as “slanderous commentary” 
did not constitute an identifying mark.166  In Bloedel v. Cromwell, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court held that “[n]ames or initials on a ballot 
are generally and naturally regarded as identifying marks.  
Explanations that they were intended for another purpose must be 
excluded.”167  Regardless, the Canvassing Board consistently held 
that voters who changed their votes and initialed their corrections 
did not improperly identify their ballots.168
 
 162. See Video: State Canvassing Board - Day 2/part 2, 56:19–57:30 (Minn. House 
Public Information Services Dec. 17, 2008), available at http://www.house.leg
.state.mn.us/htv/programa.asp?ls_year=85&event_id=1744. 
  It is clear that not only 
 163. See Video: State Canvassing Board - Day 3/part 3, 7:00–7:31 (Minn. House 
Public Information Services Dec. 18, 2008), available at http://www.house.leg
.state.mn.us/htv/programa.asp?ls_year=85&event_id=1751. 
 164. See Video: State Canvassing Board - Day 3/part 2, 1:38:50 (Minn. House 
Public Information Services Dec. 18, 2008), available at http://www.house.leg
.state.mn.us/htv/programa.asp?ls_year=85&event_id=1748. 
 165. 216 Minn. 69, 73–74, 11 N.W.2d 780, 784 (1943). 
 166. See Video: State Canvassing Board - Day 4/part 1, 7:40–7:55 (Minn. House 
Public Information Services Dec. 19, 2008), available at http://www.house.leg
.state.mn.us/htv/programa.asp?ls_year=85&event_id=1753. 
 167. 104 Minn. 487, 490, 116 N.W. 947, 949 (1908).  This is not the rule in 
other jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Courtney v. Abels, 17 So. 2d 824, 825 (La. 1944) (“A 
distinction . . . has to be made between [a distinguishing] mark and one which, on 
the other hand, merely indicates the attempt of the voter to correct a mistake 
honestly made by him in marking his ballot, for again the courts and the law are 
equally as zealous in safeguarding and protecting the right of the voter to cast his 
ballot and to have it counted.”). 
 168. See Video: State Canvassing Board - Day 1/part 2, 37:46–38:45 (Minn. House 
Public Information Services Dec. 16, 2008), available at http://www.house.leg.
state.mn.us/htv/programa.asp?ls_year=85&event_id=1742. 
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were some of the decisions of the 2008 Canvassing Board 
inconsistent, but many decisions went directly against established 
case law.  Bush v. Gore rejected decisions that varied “from county to 
county,” and the situation was similar in Minnesota.169
Beyond the disenfranchisement and unequal treatment of 
voters, additional arguments undermine, if not eliminate, the value 
of Minnesota’s identifying mark statutes.  First, the statutes are, at 
best, overinclusive.  Most instances in which the statutes have been 
applied involve no actual or apparent corruption or vote-buying.  
Generally speaking, the cases either explicitly acknowledge the 
good faith of the voter, or are silent as to any bad intentions.  In 
Bloedel, for example, the court held that “this ballot was properly 
excluded by the trial court, although it was cast in good faith, 
without fraud or corruption, and without any intention of 
identifying it.”
 
170
Indeed, a search of commercial legal databases yielded no 
instance in which a voter had been prosecuted under section 
204C.18, subdivision 2 of the Minnesota Statute.  The only instance 
the author was able to uncover in which it was even alleged that a 
vote-buying scheme was evidenced through identifying marks 
occurred in the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
 
171  In 
that case, the Commonwealth’s Board of Elections found that 
“voters voluntarily entered code names such as ‘Rambo,’ ‘Bimbo,’ 
‘RM Dela Cruz No. 1’ and ‘RM Dela Cruz No. 15’ on their ballots 
in order to reveal their identities” in legislative and municipal 
elections.172  Although the Ninth Circuit found that the “ballot-
marking scheme . . . constitutes a direct subversion of the freedom 
to vote as one chooses,” it held that it lacked jurisdiction to address 
a candidate’s claims.173
 
 169. 531 U.S. 98, 106 (2000). 
  This case does present disturbing facts, but 
the fact that one example of a ballot-marking scheme arose over 
twenty years ago in an outlying U.S. territory suggests that the 
 170. 104 Minn. at 491, 116 N.W. at 949 (internal quotation omitted).  See also 
Nelson v. Bullard, 155 Minn. 419, 424, 194 N.W. 308, 310 (1923) (stating that 
illiterate voters who received assistance without taking statutorily required oath 
acted without fraud); Elwell v. Comstock, 99 Minn. 261, 270–71, 109 N.W. 698, 702 
(1906); Pennington v. Hare, 60 Minn. 146, 152–54, 62 N.W. 116, 119 (Minn. 1895) 
(Collins, J., dissenting). 
 171. See Nabors v. Manglona, 829 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 172. Id. at 904. 
 173. Id. at 905. 
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identification of ballots does not pose a rampant problem.  
Certainly, no similar facts have been alleged in recent Minnesota 
elections. 
It would seem that the vast majority of voters whose ballots 
have been voided because of identifying marks simply did not know 
that placing such a mark on their ballot would invalidate it.  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court alluded to this possibility using 
considerably less charitable language in Hanson v. Emanuel: “The 
body of electors includes not only the well-informed, capable, and 
careful voter, but also the ignorant, incapable, and careless 
voter.”174  It would seem that the concerns leading to the creation 
of the identifying mark statutes—corruption and bribery—likely do 
not inhere in cases where a person has signed a ballot.  As noted, 
the statutes are, at best, overinclusive.  At worst, they address a 
problem that “may never exist,” in the words of Justice Collins.175
The overinclusive nature of the identifying mark statutes is not 
just reflected in the apparent good faith of the voters whose ballots 
were excluded.
  
The primary effect of the statutes seems to be the 
disenfranchisement of well-intentioned voters who do not know 
that placing an identifying mark upon their ballots will invalidate 
them. 
176  The Minnesota Supreme Court has gone so far 
as to suggest that unscrupulous judges could use the subjective 
nature of the identifying mark statutes to void ballots with which 
they disagreed.177  One justice suggested that applying similar rules 
may “afford an excuse for throwing out ballots marked with the 
slightest deviation from the usual form of the ‘X’ mark and offer 
too much of an opportunity for a prejudicial count.”178
The identifying mark statutes are also underinclusive in some 
respects.  First, the statutes may not always target the proper party, 
because the statutes apply only to voters who place identifying 
 
 
 174. 210 Minn. 271, 275, 297 N.W. 749, 752 (1941); See also Murray v. Floyd, 
216 Minn. 69, 73–75, 11 N.W.2d 780, 784 (1943). 
 175. Pennington v. Hare, 60 Minn. 146, 155, 62 N.W. 116, 120 (1895) (Collins, 
J., dissenting). 
 176. See MINN. STAT. § 204C.22,  subdiv. 13 (2008) (making a ballot defective 
with any identifying mark); MINN. STAT. § 204C.18, subdiv. 2 (2008) (making it a 
misdemeanor to place any mark on a ballot). 
 177. State v. Hanson, 229 Minn. 341, 360, 38 N.W.2d 845, 855 (1949) (Loring, 
C.J., dissenting). 
 178. Id. 
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marks on their ballots.179  They would not apply, however, to an 
election judge who corruptly directs a voter to place an identifying 
mark on a ballot, hoping to invalidate the ballot.180  Although there 
was no claim of corruption, this fact pattern occurred in Elwell v. 
Comstock: “[T]hey had no intention of identifying their ballots, but 
understood the judges of election to direct them to indorse their 
initials thereon.”181  Another case noted that election officers “are 
in a position appreciably to affect results.”182  It should be noted 
that Marshall v. Stepka held that marks made by election judges (as 
opposed to voters) did not invalidate ballots.183  It would appear, 
however, that the decision of Elwell remains in force,184
Second, the identifying mark statutes do not target activities 
with the greatest potential for fraud.
 because the 
voter in that case signed the ballot himself, albeit at the election 
judge’s direction.   
185 A greater potential for fraud 
might exist with absentee voting, where voters do not have the 
physical protections present at the polling place and ballots are out 
of the control of election judges for prolonged periods.186  Third, 
the application of the identifying mark statutes may be 
underinclusive.187  During the 2008 U.S. Senate recount, the 
Canvassing Board held that many ballots were not voided, even 
though they contained statements that could have made the ballots 
easily identifiable.  In several cases, voters expressed various “public 
policy views,” but they were held not to be identifying marks.188
 
 179. MINN. STAT. § 204C.22, subdiv. 13 (2008); § 204C.18, subdiv. 2 (2008). 
  
The Board found another ballot not identified that contained a 
 180. MINN. STAT. § 204C.22, subdiv. 13 (2008); § 204C.18, subdiv. 2 (2008). 
 181. 99 Minn. 261, 271, 109 N.W. 698, 702 (1906);  See also Johnson v. 
Swenson, 264 Minn. 449, 452–53, 119 N.W.2d 723, 726 (1963). 
 182. Nelson v. Bullard, 155 Minn. 419, 428, 194 N.W. 308, 312 (1923). 
 183. 259 Minn. 553, 558–60, 108 N.W.2d 614, 618–19 (1961). 
 184. It should be noted that the court in Bell v. Gannaway stated that “prior 
contrary case law relied upon by the contestant has, at least sub silentio, been 
overruled by Fitzgerald.” 303 Minn. 346, 349, 227 N.W.2d 797, 801 (1975); Fitzgerald 
v. Morlock, 264 Minn. 520, 120 N.W.2d 339 (1963).  
 185. See MINN. STAT. § 204C.22 subdiv. 13; MINN. STAT. § 204C.18 subdiv. 2. 
 186. See, e.g., John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, The Absentee Ballot and the 
Secret Ballot: Challenges for Election Reform, 36 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 483 (2003). 
 187. See MINN. STAT. § 204C.18, subdiv. 2 (2008); MINN. STAT. 204C.22, subdiv. 
13 (2008). 
 188. See, e.g., Video: State Canvassing Board – Day 2/part 1, 51:44–52:26 (Minn. 
House Public Information Services Dec. 17, 2008), available at http://www.house
.leg.state.mn.us/htv/archivessem.asp?ls_year=85. 
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distinctive symbol (a circle with a crooked arrow) in several write-in 
spots.189  Various other extraneous statements, which could 
theoretically have been arranged in advance to identify a voter, 
were nonetheless found not to be identifying marks.190
The application of the statutes is also underinclusive on a 
broad scale.  During the 2008 elections, nearly all ballots in 
Minnesota were tabulated by optical scan machines,
 
191 authorized 
by Minnesota statute.192  If there is no recount or post-election 
review, the ballots remain unseen until the end of the retention 
period of twenty-two months.193  It is only if a ballot is challenged 
(i.e., during a manual recount or election contest) that the 
identifying mark statutes may be applied.194  If ballot marking 
schemes were commonplace, one would think that all ballots 
containing identifying marks should be voided, regardless of the 
closeness of the election.  The failure of the identifying mark 
statutes to recognize the ubiquity of optical scanning machines 
highlights the anachronistic nature of the statutes.  Indeed, in 
McVeigh v. Spang, the court held that a “mark placed upon the back 
of a ballot . . . is more of an identification mark than if placed on 
the face of the ballot.  The voter, before returning his ballot, is 
required to fold it so as to conceal its face and all marks 
thereon.”195
 
 189. Video: State Canvassing Board – Day 3/part 2, 50:30–51:33 (Minn. House 
Public Information Services Dec. 17, 2008), available at http://www.house.leg
.state.mn.us/htv/archivessem.asp?ls_year=85. 
  This concern is not at all relevant when a ballot is not 
folded, but is placed into an optical scan machine.  The small 
number of recounts that occur is further evidence of the 
underinclusive nature of the application of the identifying mark 
statutes.  State-funded recounts occur only when the margin 
 190. See, e.g., Video: State Canvassing Board - Day 3/part 3, 15:44–16:24 (Minn. 
House Public Information Services Dec. 18, 2008), available at http:// www.house.
leg.state.mn.us/htv/archivessem.asp?ls_year=85 (displaying two separate non-
identified ballots with the words “I love you, Barack” written on one ballot and 
“Thanks for counting my vote!” written on another). 
 191. See generally OFFICE OF THE MINN. SEC’Y OF STATE, UNOFFICIAL RESULTS 
GENERAL (2008), available at http://electionresults.sos.state.mn.us/20081104/
PrecRpt.asp?M=TPR (listing the estimated voter turnout in each Minnesota 
county, along with the date and exact time that each precinct reported its voting 
results). 
 192. MINN. STAT. § 206.55 (2008). 
 193. MINN. STAT. § 204B.40 (2008). 
 194. MINN. STAT. § 209.06 (2008). 
 195. 178 Minn. 578, 580, 228 N.W. 155, 157 (1929). 
2. Freiberg.docx 11/21/2009  6:39 PM 
2009] MINNESOTA’S IDENTIFYING MARK STATUTE 67 
separating two candidates is less than one-half of one percent.196  In 
2008, recounts occurred in only two out of 134 state house races – 
approximately 1.5%.197
IV. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS AND CONCLUSION 
  The fact that the identifying mark statutes 
would be applied in only such a small number of races suggests that 
ballot marking schemes are not a pervasive problem.  Indeed, it is 
ironic that these races are the ones in which the statutes would be 
applied.  One would think that it would be particularly critical to 
count every vote in such a close race.  Yet the effect of the 
identifying mark statutes is to disenfranchise numerous voters in 
close races. 
As part of his 2009 Legislative Agenda, Minnesota Secretary of 
State Mark Ritchie proposed a change in law that would define “an 
identifying mark on a ballot as a name outside of the space for a 
write-in, a signed ballot, or an ID number written on the ballot.”198  
Legislation was introduced in both the House of Representatives 
and Senate to effectuate this goal.199  None of this language was 
adopted into law, nor did the final version of the Omnibus Election 
Bill contain the language.200
The proposed legislation would be an improvement in some 
respects.  Primarily, it will remove the subjective nature of 
 
 
 196. MINN. STAT. § 204C.35, subdiv. 1 (2008) (federal, state, and judicial 
elections); MINN. STAT. § 204C.36, subdiv. 1 (2008) (county, school district, and 
municipal elections). 
 197. See OFFICE OF THE MINN. SEC’Y OF STATE,  RECOUNT PLAN (11/18/08), 
available at http://www.sos.state.mn.us/docs/2008_general_election_final_recount_
plan_rev_nov_19.pdf. 
 198. See OFFICE OF THE MINN. SEC’Y OF STATE, 2009 LEGISLATIVE AGENDA, available 
at http://www.sos.state.mn.us/docs/2009_legislative_proposal_fact_sheet.pdf. 
 199. See H.F. 1137, 2009 Leg., 86th Sess. (Minn. 2009), S.F. 768, 2009 Leg., 
86th Sess. (Minn. 2009), S.F. 1331, 2009 Leg., 86th Sess. (Minn. 2009) (third 
engrossment).  These bills relate only to Minn. Stat. § 204C.22, subdiv. 13, which 
provides that identified ballots are defective.  Legislation was also introduced to 
modify Minn. Stat. § 204C.18, subdiv. 2, the complementary criminal statute.  
However, this legislation made only minor changes.  H.F. 1229, 2009 Leg., 86th 
Sess. (Minn. 2009), H.F. 1266, 2009 Leg., 86th Sess. (Minn. 2009), and S.F. 659, 
2009 Leg., 86th Sess. (Minn. 2009).  These changes modified the criminal statute 
only as it relates to the initialing of ballots by election judges.  S.F. 662, 2009 Leg., 
86th Sess. (Minn. 2009), would provide that a name written on a write-in line does 
not constitute an identification mark for purposes of a criminal penalty. 
 200. See Conference Committee Report to S.F. 1331, 2009 Leg., 86th Sess. 
(Minn. 2009) (third engrossment).  This legislation was vetoed by Governor 
Pawlenty on May 22, 2009. 
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determining what constitutes an identifying mark.  Only names, 
identification numbers, and signatures would constitute such 
marks.  The legislation also clears up an issue that occurred 
occasionally in case law by stating that properly placed write-in 
votes are not identifying marks. 
However, the legislation would still cause voters to be 
disenfranchised in close races.  Voters unfamiliar with the 
requirements of the law might sign their ballot in good faith but 
have their ballots excluded.  The statute would also be superfluous 
in that ballots not subjected to a hand recount—the vast majority of 
ballots cast in the state—would not be voided, even if identifying 
marks were present. 
In at least one way, this legislation would in fact exacerbate the 
problem of disenfranchisement.  As the statute is currently written, 
it must be evident “that the voter intended to identify the ballot” 
for a ballot to be voided.201  The legislation would do away with the 
intent to identify requirement. As a result, a ballot will be voided if 
a voter places any name outside of the write-in box, regardless of 
whether or not the voter intends to identify the ballot.  The 
experience from the 2008 U.S. Senate recount suggests that this is 
more than a speculative possibility.202  Indeed, members of the 
Canvassing Board used this intent requirement to hold that certain 
markings were not identifying marks, and that the ballots could be 
counted.203
Rather than attempting to salvage the existing identifying 
mark laws as these bills do, it would be preferable to simply repeal 
them.  There appears to be no instance of a vote-buying scheme 
being evidenced by unique ballot markings in Minnesota since the 
state switched to the Australian ballot system in 1891.  A 
nonexistent threat of an awkward form of corruption does not 
appear to be a strong rationale for the disenfranchisement of a 
large number of presumably well-meaning voters. 
  The law could even be interpreted to void ballots 
where an election judge (rather than the voter) had written a name 
on the ballot. 
 
 201. MINN. STAT. § 204C.22, subdiv. 13 (2008). 
 202. See, e.g., Video: State Canvassing Board - Day 3/part 3, supra note 190.  
 203. See, e.g., Video: State Canvassing Board - Day 1/part 1, 34:30–34:55 (Minn. 
House Public Information Services Dec. 16, 2008), available at http://www.
house.leg.state.mn.us/htv/programa.asp?ls_year=85&event_id=1741 (Chief Justice 
Magnuson stated he did not believe the initials written on the ballot warranted 
rejection of the entire ballot).   
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To the extent vote buying and other forms of corruption and 
bribery are concerns, they would be better addressed by 
Minnesota’s existing, more broadly phrased bribery and voter fraud 
statutes.204  Presumably, any actual ballot-marking scheme would 
fall under one of these statutes.  The penalty in these statutes is a 
felony205 and a gross misdemeanor206
The Minnesota Supreme Court has noted that “we are not free 
to change at will our prior rulings construing present election 
laws.”
—the same or stronger penalty 
that is in the criminal identifying mark statute.  Consequently, 
sufficient deterrence should exist to prevent vote-buying schemes 
that could be evidenced by identifying marks. 
207
 
  Because of the sedentary nature of these precedents, any 
legislator contemplating comprehensive election reform should 
seriously contemplate abandoning anachronistic statutory 
language.  Minnesota’s identifying mark statutes fit squarely into 
this category, and should simply be repealed. 
 
 204. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 211B.07-13 (2008); MINN. STAT. § 609.42 (2008). 
 205. MINN. STAT. § 211B.13 (2008) (Minnesota’s current bribery, treating, and 
solicitation statute). 
 206. MINN. STAT. § 211B.07 (2008) (Minnesota’s current undue influence on 
voters statute). 
 207. Sperl v. Wegwerth, 265 Minn. 47, 49, 120 N.W.2d 355, 357 (1963). 
